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THE SELFLESS VOTER 
Altruism and Irrationality in Economic Voting 
Byrne, John 
      
Abstract 
An assumption of classical political economics is that voters vote in their own 
self-interest. However, in every election, we can observe individuals supporting 
policies and candidates that would raise the individuals’ taxes or provide fewer 
government benefits. Why is this? Under what conditions does irrational voting 
occur? First, I investigate the irrational voter with a theoretical investigation of 
motives and causes for irrationality. Then, using data from the National Election 
Survey, I create various regression models to observe the propensity of different 
voting populations to support financially irrational policy platforms. Finally, I 
explore how an understanding of irrational voting might have broader 
implications on our conceptualization of voter motivation and what this might 
mean for the political climate. 
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Why people vote has been extensively written about and has been answered with a 
plethora of hypotheses. According to traditional thought and good evidence, the state of the 
economy is prioritized over other political considerations. This follows the popular definition of 
politics, a discussion of “who gets what, when, and how”.  As Downs (1957) pointed out, 
economics and politics are largely thought of as separate realms in classical liberalism, and any 
influence of one on the models of another is considered interference and strictly exogenous. He 
says that just as government economic regulation is a central component of a healthy economy, 
rather than an authoritarian interference, so too does the state of the economy play a primary role 
in deciding elections. Seeking to build upon the foundation that Downs lay, Kramer (1971) was 
the first to provide empirical evidence of economic variables as a primary cause for variation 
among American congressional and presidential elections. Given that economic voting exists and 
is significant in determining elections, many questions arise. Do people vote for policies that 
benefit themselves or the economy? Do voters make their decisions based on the incumbent’s 
past performance or do they vote for the candidate whom they think is the best fit for the future 
economy. And finally, when voters do not vote according to economic reason, is their 
irrationality explained by altruism? In this paper, I seek to understand the truth about political 




 When writing of the interplay between economics and politics, Downs summoned the 
classical economic assumption of human nature: “Because the citizens of our model democracy 
are rational, each of them views elections strictly as means of selecting the government most 
beneficial to him. Each citizen estimates the utility income from government action he expects 
each party would provide him if it were in power in the forthcoming election period” (138). This 
is called pocketbook voting: voting in the strict interest of one’s own financial interests. This is a 
smooth translation of classical economic theory from the minds of Adam Smith and John 
Maynard Keynes into a political model. Do the fundamental assumptions of Smith’s Invisible 
Hand adequately explain economic voting? The literature finds that, yes, voters are significantly 
interested in the improvement of their own welfare though their behavior is not always as direct 
as Downs would suggest. 
Franko, Tolbert, and Witko (2013) investigate the support among the poor for 
redistributive taxes. Obviously, under the assumption of rational, pocketbook economic voting, 
low-income voters should support redistributive taxes because they would be directly benefitted. 
The authors indeed find that when redistributive policies are communicated clearly to the public, 
low-income voters will overwhelmingly support such programs, specifically during periods of 
especially high wealth inequality; this final condition implies that a sizable portion of this 
income group will not support redistributive policies when wealth inequality is more tame 
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despite the policy benefitting them just the same. Healy et al. (2017) found similar results in an 
individual-level study of financial and political data, concluding that economic voters are as 
likely to vote in their own interest as they are in the national economy’s interest. 
 Sociotropic voting is a form of economic voting in which the voter uses national and 
aggregate economic factors and reasoning to make voting decisions. This can manifest as an 
individual’s voting according to the incumbent’s economic performance in the past term, the 
unemployment rate, wage stagnation, or other aggregate measures that do not necessarily directly 
impact the voter. Some assume this to be altruistic voting because the target of improvement is 
the greater economy instead of the individual. However, voting in the interest of the economy 
does not necessarily imply any sort of selflessness or patriotism. Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck (2011) 
argue that socioeconomic voting cannot be ruled as altruistic because the voter is a member of 
the economy and will therefore realize potential rewards from an improved economy even if the 
socioeconomic vote did not affect them directly. It is possible that voters utilize sociotropic 
voting as a proxy for pocketbook voting when they have difficulty differentiating economic and 
political influences from other individualized factors in their recent financial performance. One 
author notes that a voter would likely not credit the occupant of the White House with the large 
inheritance they received after their grandparent’s passing and, therefore, cannot easily assume 
that their individual financial performance is representative of the incumbent government’s 
performance. Assuming that these authors are correct, then neither pocketbook nor sociotropic 
voting is inherently financially irrational. 
What is altruistic voting exactly? Because sociotropic voting might be beneficial to the 
voter, as they are an economic actor, this leaves open the question of what vote, then, can be cast 
that can be described as altruistic and not eventually self-interested? If there are policies that 
would directly and negatively influence the voter but benefit some other group, would such a 
vote even be considered? Some authors (Kau and Rubin 1979; Peltzman 1984; Holmes 1990) 
posit that altruistic voting is synonymous with ideological voting, though this complicates things 
further. The effects of partisanship on an individual’s vote are two-fold. 
Firstly, party identification can shape the ideals and values the voter holds. This alone 
would not affect the voter’s rationality. For example, if the individual is more ideologically 
libertarian, they may support more subsidized privatization of sectors typically state-run because 
they favor a variety of suppliers to choose from, such as those who support school choice. A 
progressive voter might reach the opposite conclusion, thinking that a cohesive national 
education system would eliminate some educational discrepancies across states. Both 
conclusions are rational conclusions given their different ideological values. 
Secondly, partisanship also has a heavy hand in influencing voters’ perception of policy 
and national status that may obscure, for example, responsibility for recent economic 
performance. If a voter believes the opposing governmental party or policy is responsible for a 
recent recession, for example, or if the voter has an objectively false view of the recession, then 
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the voter may make an irrational choice. Returning to my previous education example, a 
progressive voter might be irrationally opposed to an increase in the Department of Education’s 
budget if it is proposed by a Republican president despite such a policy being aligned with the 
voter’s base values. 
Some evidence suggests that some amount of economic voting irrationality is caused not 
by altruism but by partisanship. This is an important factor to consider in any analysis because 
voters are not purely rational agents voting for marginal financial gains like an accountant. 
Voters may be heavily biased one way or another and this bias may even convince the voter that 
a policy is against their own interest when the opposite is true. As they did in studying the 
prevalence of pocketbook versus sociotropic voting, Healy et al. (2017) find that there is some 
truth to both sides. The authors find that there is statistically significant partisan bias in a voter’s 




 Common current scholarship concludes that altruism and politics rarely go together 
outside of manifestos and campaign ads. This, however, is likely not true. Despite the traditional 
and logical, if pessimistic, perception that voters are strictly self-interested, researchers have 
already observed some societal concern and sympathy for other groups that is exhibited by 
voters. This simple fact, that voters are sometimes concerned with societal issues that do not 
affect them personally, implies that there is some level of altruism in elections and not strictly 
direct or indirect pocketbook voting. 
 Voters have an ideal in their minds of what their country should be and how it should 
look beyond short-term economic considerations. While it is true that many may vote for which 
candidate’s tax platform may be most beneficial for their tax bracket, people also vote for what 
they think is just for others. Imagine an auditorium of a thousand wealthy individuals that make 
about $400,000 per year, all working in industries that use little to no minimum-wage work. A 
marginal change in their local minimum wage would likely not affect them at all as they will 
make no extra money, nor do they have any employees whom they would need to pay more. In 
other words, their pocketbooks have no skin in the game. Now, is it safe to assume that not one 
of these individuals has an opinion of the optimal minimum wage just because they have no 
wealth to be gained or lost? Of course not. They consider what policy would move the nation 
closer to their ideal.  
 This is not necessarily altruism, of course, because choosing what one believes is morally 
right over what is viewed as morally wrong is easy when neither option affects a voter 
personally. This also could be an example of the pocketbook voting-by-proxy that was discussed 
previously. What is not expected, and what I hope to observe, is the prioritization of this societal 
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ideal over the interests of the pocketbook. Assuming that the voters are accurately informed of 
the nature of their options and given that morality and justice are truly factors in a voter’s 
calculus, I expect to observe cases in which certain individuals will place their ethical values 
over their own financial wellbeing. In these cases, the voters will be from a subset of the 
population that is negatively affected by a given policy platform and yet vote for it anyway. This 
would not be self-interested sociotropic voting because the individual would be negatively 
affected to an extent that indirect benefit from wider economic improvement could not correct. 
 
Research Design 
I will conduct three experiments; each will measure support for a certain policy platform. 
Each of these policy platforms is inherently against the interests of a specific demographic in the 
United States, so the purpose of the model is to measure the support for each policy platform 
among the negatively affected demographic. Deviation from voting against the platform is 
assumed to be altruistic voting because of the negative repercussions to the respondent. 
I will be using data from the National Election Survey (NES) from 2012, a dataset that 
collects information on demographics, opinions, ideological identification, and more. To test the 
data, I will be running different linear regression models to observe the support from the 
significant population on the chosen policy platform. I will also be including various 
demographic variables such as race, gender, party identification, and age into the regression to 
control for any confounding factors that might inhibit the accuracy of the regression. I will also 
use a variety of interaction terms to control for possible collinearity, such as between party 
identification and income; voters are typically more conservative as their income increases, for 
example. 
If not already a variable in the model, the following are the demographic variables that 
will be included in each model. These variables account for race (white: Not white = 0, white = 
1), gender (my male Dummy: Not male = 0, male = 1), a proxy for party affiliation (ft_rep, a 
feeling thermometer for the Republican party: a higher number means stronger approval for the 
party), education (my_educGroup: 0 = N/A, 1 = < High School diploma, 2 = HS diploma, 3 = 
post-HS degree, 4 = bachelor’s degree, 5 = graduate’s degree), age (dem_age6: 1 = 17-29, 2 = 
30-39, 3 = 40-49, 4 = 50-59, 5 = 60-69, 6 = 70 and older), and income quintile (income5). As 
previously stated, there are interaction terms to account for related variables. These interaction 
terms are for party identification and income (partyID_Income) and party identification and 
education (partyID_educ3). 
 
The first model observes the support for increasing the federal government’s education 
budget. Theoretically, any voter that does not have children would see no personal benefit to this 
increase and any material societal improvement that the voter might benefit from would take 
Byrne 5 
 
years to come to fruition. This would also most likely mean higher taxes, a direct negative affect 
on the voter. Therefore, we can assume that any voter without children that supports increasing 
the federal education budget is doing so altruistically. I expect that having children is statistically 
significant in increasing the likelihood that a respondent wishes to increase the federal education 
budget, but it will not be a perfect predictor because of nonparents who value quality education 
more than the additional taxes they will accrue.  
For model 1, the dependent variable is whether the respondent wishes to increase, 
decrease, or maintain the federal budget for education (my_schoolSpend: 1 = decrease, 2 = 
maintain, 3 = increase). The key independent variable is a dummy variable for whether the 
respondent has children (my_childDummy: 0 = No, 1 = Yes). NEED TO EXPLANIN THAT 
YOU ANALYZED BY AGE BECAUSE OF YOUNG PEOPLE WHO EXPECT TO  HAVE 
CHILDREN. 
my_schoolSpend = β0 + β1 my_childDummy… 
The second model, model 2, tests if a respondent’s income is an accurate predictor of 
their opinion on redistributive programs. If all respondents involved are perfectly rational 
pocketbook voters, their income and desire for wealth distribution should be perfectly inversely 
related. It would only be the lower income voters who altruistically desire a decentralized, liberal 
economy that would oppose redistributive efforts and high-income voters that altruistically 
desire better conditions for the less fortunate who would support it. 
The variable used to represent support for redistributive economic policies is a recode of 
cses_govtact (my_govtAct: 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = slightly disagree, 3 = indifferent, 4 = 
slightly agree, 5 = strongly agree). This was gathered by asking respondents to rate, on a scale 
from 1 to 5, how strongly they agree with the government taking action to diminish income 
inequality. The key dependent variable, income (income5), is a 1 to 5 scale representing which 
quintile of the income distribution the respondent reports to be in.  
my_govtAct = β0 + β1 income5… 
The third and final model, model 3, tests the effect age has on a respondent’s support for 
governmental protection of the environment. Assuming self-interest, rational voting behavior, I 
should observe limited support for environmental protection among the elderly because the 
chance that they will experience the extreme consequences of climate change decreases as they 
get older. In addition to not experiencing any benefit themselves, the elderly would likely be 
voting to increase their own taxes. Much like model 1, there would be no immediate benefit to 
the voter demographic in question if this policy were to be implemented because any possible 
pocketbook benefit is too long-term to seriously consider, and the policy heavily implies short-
term tax increases. Importantly, I will also include an interaction effect between the respondent’s 
age and whether they have children. This is because an elderly voter may care very deeply about 
climate change because of their children or grandchildren. Although some may claim that this is 
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an act of altruism, here I am going to define this as self-interested because it concerns the voter 
individually (roughly) and not the nation1. 
Model 3’s dependent variable to represent support for governmental environment 
protection policies is fedspend_enviroR (0 = Decrease, 1 = Maintain, 2 =  Increase). The 
independent variables are dem_age6 (dem_age6: 1 = 17-29, 2 = 30-39, 3 = 40-49, 4 = 50-59, 5 = 
60-69, 6 = 70 and older) and the previously detailed my_childDummy. Finally, the interaction 
term is my_ageXchildren. 




my_schoolSpend = β0 + β1 my_childDummy + β2 white + β3 my_maleDummy + β4 







1 I should reiterate that I do not mean to say, at any point in this paper, that self-interest is morally wrong 
and altruism the sole good. Self-interest is not synonymous with selfishness: if you did not sometimes eat food out 
of self-interest you would starve to death, which is not good. 
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my_govtAct = β0 + β1 income5 + β2 white + β3 my_maleDummy + β4 ft_rep + β5 my_educGroup 




fedspend_enviroR = β0 + β1 dem_age6 + β2 white + β3 my_maleDummy + β4 ft_rep + β5 
my_educGroup + β6 dem_age6 + β7income5+ β8 my_ageXchildren + ε 
 
Data Analysis 
 The models return varying results regarding altruistic support of each of the three 
policies. Model 1 shows that, at the 95% confidence level, there is a statistically significant 
positive correlation between the respondent having a child and desiring to increase the federal 
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budget for education. Race and age are also statistically significant: as the respondent gets older, 
it is more likely that they will oppose increasing the budget for education. This may be because 
their children are grown and no longer in school. Race is significant in that there is a correlation 
between being white and preferring to decrease the education budget. It seems likely that this is 
because white people are predominately wealthier than people of color and therefore less reliant 
on the public school system, though income was notably not statistically significant in this 
regression, perhaps because it is measured by quintile and not as a continuous variable, making it 
a very blunt and sloppy instrument. 
 As predicted, parents are more likely to vote for better public education than nonparents. 
Also fitting my hypothesis, these variables are not perfectly or near-perfectly correlated either, 
meaning that there are significant exceptions to the pocketbook voting theory. This persistent, 
unexplained deviation implies financial irrationality, possibly altruism, is still a significant 
factor. This should perhaps be investigated more closely, more on this in the conclusion. 
 Model 2 shows an extraordinary deviation from traditional thought. Approval of 
government-led wealth redistribution is not correlated with the income of the respondent at all 
according to this model. The same is true for the ideological identity of the voter, this regression 
showing no correlation between approval of redistribution and conservatism. As with the first 
model, income being measured by quintile may be throwing off the regression and decreasing 
the accuracy of the model but the proxy conservatism variable having no correlation to opinions 
on progressive policy remains baffling. 
 Finally, model 3 meets predictions by showing a negative correlation between age and 
approval of the government combatting climate change. The elderly have a difficult time 
justifying paying higher taxes for a benefit that they may never see, understandably so, but even 
still, the coefficient for age in this regression is not even the most drastic of the significant 
variables. There remains unexplored motives that self-interest cannot contain. The lack of 
statistical significance for the parenthood dummy variable contradicts the hypothesis that the 
elderly would more strongly support environmental protection if it meant a better future for their 
children. Perhaps a more accurate variable would have been a test of the respondent’s 
grandparenthood but if the respondent has a grandchild, they surely have a child as well. 
 One thing that is consistent amongst these models is that the individual financial effect of 
a policy on a voter is not the be-all-end-all that classical politics and economics believe it to be. 
Even in cases in which the pocketbook voter theory may have correctly predicted the outcome, 
the key independent variable was never close to perfect predication nor accurate enough to 
generalize. Because this fdeviation remains unexplored and fails to be explained fully by self-
interested thinking,a similar method to the one use in this paper with further refinement could 
produce more illuminating material on this topic in the future. 
 In looking at more practical applications of this knowledge, using altruism to mobilize 
politics, if people, could create more passion and excitement for politics while decreasing the 
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toxic and tribalist nature between so many groups. If anything, understanding that altruistic 
voting is not irregular can assist in creating a healthier political community simply because 
everyone can acknowledge respectable intentions from others. 
 
Conclusion 
 There is still much to learn about the motives of voters and what influences their 
decision-making progress but there is one thing that we might all be able to safely conclude: the 
assumption that voters are only self-interested is incorrect. Through testing support for policies 
among specific demographics, it was found that an observer can find support for a given 
platform among any group. This means that there is, consistently, altruism in the political 
system. To what degree altruism is prevalent in the voting process and how it might be harnessed 
or encouraged is still yet to be discovered, though a highly suggest topic of further research, but 
might encourage some sort of optimism in the future political system that might be a reversion of 
the toxic political landscape America is currently experiencing which has alienated so many. 
 Further research of political altruism is recommended. Firstly, identifying more cases in 
which voters cast their ballots “irrationally” according to traditional pocketbook though will help 
illuminate the commonalities between cases of altruism and, possibly, causation. Additionally, 
the strength of altruistic tendencies when faced with various incentives would be groundbreaking 
if there was a consistent way of not only observing political altruism but quantifying it. This new 
hopeful field in political science paves new roads ahead for our understanding of politics and, 
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